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Abstract 
Similar to most other developing countries, almost all Arab countries failed to catch up 
economically with advanced industrial countries. This paper discusses three possible 
explanations of the disappointing growth performance: (i) an insufficient reform-
mindedness of developing country governments, (ii) counterproductive policy recipes 
of the Washington Consensus and (iii) more deeply rooted barriers to growth related to 
institutional deficiencies prevailing in various developing countries. The empirical 
evidence for Arab countries and other developing countries provides little support to 
the first two hypotheses. By contrast, institutional development is shown to have a 
significant impact on policy-related variables and the growth performance of 
developing countries. For Arab countries as a group, institutional development is more 
advanced than for the control group of other developing countries. Yet, serious 
institutional deficiencies tend to constrain future growth in several Arab countries. 
These findings have important implications for national policymakers and the 
international community. 
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Developing countries have performed vastly different in terms of per-capita 
income growth since 1980. For most of them, hopes that globalisation would 
render it easier to catch up economically to advanced industrial countries were 
frustrated. Arab countries are no exception in this regard, as Section II will 
show. The major objective of this paper is to discuss alternative explanations of 
divergent growth trends in the past and to derive policy conclusions as to how 
the growth performance may be improved in the future. 
The reasons why only few developing countries narrowed the income gap to 
industrial countries are highly disputed. The World Bank and the IMF maintain 
that economic policy prescriptions according to the so-called Washington 
Consensus (Williamson 1990) were essentially correct and effective. These 
institutions tend to blame the developing countries for not having followed 
external advice, or having implemented policy reforms at best partially. In a 
similar vein, a recent report published by the Study Group on Middle East Trade 
Options of the Council on Foreign Relations argues that the poor economic 
performance of many countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is 





The major responsibility for the poor growth record would then rest with the 
developing countries themselves. By contrast, various critics of the World Bank 
and the IMF argue that the standard recipes utterly failed to deliver what had 
been promised by their proponents. We will check both claims in Sections III 
and IV.  
We then turn to a third explanation of the divergent growth patterns. According 
to the hypothesis advanced by prominent development economists in recent 
years, the Washington Consensus was hardly effective in inducing catching-up 
processes because it ignored more deeply rooted barriers to growth, notably the 
institutional deficiencies prevailing in many developing countries (Section V). 
Section VI summarizes and offers some policy conclusions for national 
policymakers and the international community. 
In order to assess the experience of Arab countries, a large group of developing 
countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America serves as the  point of reference. 
The comparison between Arab countries and the control group of other 
developing countries relates to growth performance, economic policies, and 
institutional development as well as the links between these three factors. The 





Arab Planning Institute (API).
1 In addition, some references are made to Algeria 
(A), Morocco (Mo), and Saudi Arabia (SA). 
II.  Catching Up and Falling Back 
The evidence presented in this section supports the view that the economic 
performance of many Arab countries during the past decades has been 
"disappointing" (Hoekman and Messerlin 2002: 1). The economic growth 
performance of Arab countries and other developing countries is measured in 
the following by relating their per-capita income (in PPP terms) to the per-capita 
income of the United States (representing the group of advanced industrial 
countries) and by comparing this relative income measure between the years 

















with i=sample countries. 
                                           
1   This focus is because this paper was motivated by a conference on "Institutions and 
Development Performance" organized by the Arab Planning Institute. API members 
are (abbreviations used below are given in parentheses): Bahrain (B), Egypt (E), 
Iraq (I), Jordan (J), Kuwait (K), Lebanon (Le), Libya (Li), Mauritania (M), Oman 
(O), Qatar (Q), Sudan (Su), Syria (Sy), Tunisia (T), United Arab Emirates (U), and 





According to this formula, GNIUS  =  1 represents the dividing line between 
developing countries which caught up to the United States (GNIUS > 1) and 
those which fell further back (GNIUS < 1). 
Figure 1 shows that less than one quarter of the 88 sample countries achieved a 
higher growth of per-capita income than the United States. A few impressive 
cases of catching up contrast sharply with many developing countries which fell 
back significantly. Among API members for which sufficient income data are 
available from the World Bank (2002), only Egypt narrowed the income gap, 
whereas the per-capita income increased by less than in the United States, or 
even decreased, in eight API member states (as well as in Algeria, Morocco, and 
Saudi Arabia).
2 The decline in the relative income position was most 
pronounced for the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, i.e., two API members 
which are extremely dependent on oil. This is not surprising considering that oil 
prices were exceptionally high at the beginning of the observation period. 
The negative bias for major oil exporters resulting from the peak in oil prices in 
1980 can be reduced, though not eliminated, by calculating GNIUS for a shorter  
 
                                           
2  For the development of per-capita income in API member countries with sufficient 





Figure 1  —  Catching Up and Falling Back of Developing Countries
a, 1980–2000 
















aChange in per-capita income (PPP) relative to the United States. The vertical line represents 
the dividing line between countries that fell back and countries that caught up. For calculation 
procedure, see the text; Bahrain: 1980-1999; UAE: 1980-1998. 





period of observation. If 1983 (instead of 1980) is taken as the base year,
3 the 
growth performance of the group of nine API members turns out to be more 
favourable (Table 1). While the average of GNIUS increases slightly if the 
calculation is restricted to 1983–2000, the rise in the median of GNIUS is fairly 
pronounced. Nevertheless, it remains true that the relative income position of 
API members deteriorated until the end of the millennium. The average and the 
median of GNIUS both remain significantly below one. Moreover, the average 
of GNIUS, though not the median, continues to be smaller for API members 
than for other developing countries. 
Table 1 —   Changes in Per-capita Income, Relative to the  United States, for 
API Membersa and Other Developing Countries: Alternative 
Calculations of GNIUSb 
API Other 
GNIUS 
1980–2000 1983–2000 1980–2000 
Average 0.73  0.78  0.83 
Median 0.67  0.82  0.69 
aNine countries with sufficient data, as listed in Figure 1. – bSee text for calculation 
formula. Values below one indicate that the relative income position of the countries 
under consideration deteriorated. 
Source: World Bank (2002). 
                                           
3   We choose 1983 as the base year in our modified calculations because two major oil 
exporters (Bahrain and Kuwait) experienced the low point in per-capita income in 
the previous year, while the per-capita income of the United Arab Emirates 





III.  How Relevant Are Implementation Deficits? 
As mentioned in the Introduction, international financial institutions tend to 
blame developing countries for an insufficient reform-mindedness and 
implementation deficits, resulting in their fairly disappointing growth 
performance. For instance, the World Bank (1997) reported that only about one 
quarter of African countries which received structural adjustment loans during 
the period 1980–1996 fulfilled to a sufficient extent the policy conditions 
attached to these loans. As concerns IMF programmes, Bird (2001: 1855–6) 
concluded: "The most recent evidence suggests that more than two-thirds of 
programs are poorly implemented and break down." The disappointing growth 
performance of countries in the MENA region is attributed to two policy failures 
in the report by the Study Group on Middle East Trade Options of the Council 
on Foreign Relations: "One important explanation is the failure to develop links 
with the global economy through foreign investment and trade in services and 
goods other than oil. A second reason is that most of the governments in the 
Middle East and North Africa have made scant headway in reducing the 
interventionist role of the state in the economy" (Hoekman and Messerlin 2002: 
1). 
Yet, the proposition of an insufficient reform-mindedness of developing 
countries rests on weak empirical foundations. We consider several variables in 





related variables reflect the request of international financial institutions for 
macroeconomic stabilisation, factor accumulation, trade liberalisation and 
openness to foreign direct investment (FDI).
4 Macroeconomic stabilisation 
efforts are captured by two variables: (i) annual average rates of inflation and 
(ii) government consumption expenditure in per cent of GDP. Investment in 
physical and human capital is proxied by gross fixed capital formation in per 
cent of GDP and average years of schooling, respectively. Trade-policy-related 
variables include the share of imports and exports in GDP as well as import 
tariff revenues in per cent of import value.
5 Finally, openness to FDI is 
measured by FDI inflows and inward FDI stocks, both related to the host 
country's GDP.  
The question we are interested in is how these variables, which reflect the major 
thrust of the Washington Consensus, developed over time. If most developing 
countries had refused to implement the Washington Consensus, economic 
stability indicators should have deteriorated, investment in physical and human 
capital should have declined, and countries should not have opened up to trade 
and FDI. 
                                           
4   For detailed definitions of variables and statistical sources, see the Annex. 
5  We prefer import tariff revenues over mean tariff rates as the World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank present comprehensive time series data only for the 
former variable. Data on mean tariff rates from this source are deficient in particular 
with regard to API members; it is only for Oman and Tunisia that mean tariff rates 





By contrast, the evidence on policy-related variables presented in Table 2 
suggests that the economic policies pursued by API members and other 
developing countries were in accordance with the Washington Consensus in 
various respects: 
•  Compared to the median for other developing countries, inflation in API 
member countries was fairly low in the early 1980s already. Inflation was 
further reduced to a very low median in recent years.
6 
•  Government consumption, as a share of GDP, was slightly higher in API 
member countries than in other developing countries, but curtailed by 
about two percentage points in both country groups. 
•  The evidence on factor accumulation is mixed. The share of gross fixed 
capital formation in GDP fell in both country groups, though considerably 
more so for API members.
7 On the other hand, human capital formation, 
proxied by average years of schooling, improved more pronouncedly for 
API members (and Algeria). 
                                           
6  Essentially the same applies to Algeria, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia. Significant 
improvements in macroeconomic policies in the MENA region are stressed by 
Hoekman and Messerlin (2002: 6). 
7  The share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP declined most dramatically in 
Bahrain and Jordan (World Bank 2002). Non-member countries, notably Algeria 





Table 2 —  Policy-related Variablesa: Median for API Member Countries and 
Other Developing Countries 
APIb  Other 
 
1980–1983c 1997–2000c 1980–1983c 1997–2000c 
Inflation 7.8  1.6  13.1  6.5 
  (B, E, J, K, Q, Su, Sy)     
Government    17.4 15.7 14.4 12.5 
consumption  (B, E, J, K, M, Sy, T)     
Gross fixed capital  27.7  20.2  21.6  20.2 
formation  (B, E, J, K, Su, Sy, T)     
Years of schoolingd 3.3 5.6 3.3 5.1 
  (B, E, I, J, K, Su, Sy, T)     
Imports  43.6 40.9 31.5 35.3 
  (B, E, J, K, M, Su, Sy, T)     
Import tariff revenues  13.6  9.7  12.1  8.8 
  (B, E, J, K, O, Su, Sy, T)     
Exports  38.8 41.5 22.2 28.2 
  (B, E, J, K, M, Su, Sy, T)     
FDI  inflows  1.6 0.9 0.4 2.2 
  (E, J, K, M, O, Su, Sy, T)     
Inward FDI stocksd  1.7 12.3  4.3 24.2 
  (all except I, Li, M)     
aFor definition of variables and statistical sources, see Annex. – bIn parentheses: 
API members for which data are available in both periods. – cAnnual averages if not 
stated otherwise. – d1980 and 2000, respectively. 





•  Import tariff revenues accounted for less than 10 per cent of the import 
value in both county groups in recent years. The trend towards import 
liberalisation is also reflected in the increasing import share in GDP in 
other developing countries, though not in API member countries. The 
ambiguous picture for Arab countries is in line with the findings reported 
in Hoekman and Zarrouk (2000: 2), who conclude: "Virtually all Arab 
countries ... have undertaken major steps to implement tariff and fiscal 
reforms and to dismantle quantitative import restrictions. Notwithstanding 
these efforts, the pace of integration into the world economy achieved by 
the region has been slow". High transaction costs associated with 
international trade are attributed to inefficiencies in customs clearance 
procedures, administrative red tape, and deficient transportation and 
telecommunication services in many Arab countries.
8 
•  The ratio of inward FDI stocks to GDP soared in both country groups, 
which is consistent with the worldwide trend towards the liberalisation of 
FDI regulations reported by UNCTAD (2002: 7). However, the median of 
this ratio for API members remained substantially below the median for 
other developing countries. This is consistent with Nabli and De Kleine 
                                           
8  For recent survey results on barriers to trade and investment in the MENA region, 
see Zarrouk (2002). According to Hoekman and Messerlin (2002: 8), many 






(2000), who found FDI flows to Arab countries to be relatively small and 
concentrated in a limited number of sectors.
9 
All this does not invalidate the claim of international financial institutions that 
the implementation of policy conditions attached to World Bank and IMF loans 
was incomplete in various cases. On average, however, Arab countries as well 
as the large group of other developing countries have clearly moved in the 
direction suggested by the Washington Consensus. This invites the next 
question: Are widening income gaps to be attributed to counterproductive policy 
recipes of the Washington Consensus, rather than the reluctance of policymakers 
in developing countries to follow the conventional wisdom? 
IV.  How Effective Are Conventional Policy Reforms? 
Globalisation critics have long argued that the Washington Consensus bodes 
developing countries no good. Furthermore, prominent economists such as 
Easterly (2001) and Stiglitz (2002) have highlighted the shortcomings of 
conventional policy recipes recently. Hence, there is sufficient reason to check 
the effectiveness of policy-related variables in helping developing countries to 
catch up economically to advanced industrial countries. This is done in the 
                                           
9  Likewise, Hoekman and Messerlin (2002: 8) point to the limited magnitude of FDI 





following by correlating the variables introduced in the previous section with 
our measure of relative growth performance (GNIUS). Based on these cross-
country correlations for the overall sample, we assess how API members fit into 
the general pattern for all developing countries. 
Data constraints prevent us from introducing policy measures such as monetary 
restraint, investment incentives, import liberalisation, and FDI deregulation 
directly into the correlation analysis. Rather, we capture important transmission 
mechanisms (macroeconomic stability, factor accumulation, trade intensity, and 
inward FDI) through which policy measures may impact on economic growth. 
The policy-related variables are largely defined as before. However, the 
subsequent cross-country analysis requires some adjustments. Inflation (INF), 
government consumption (GOV), gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) and FDI 
inflows (FDIFL) are calculated as annual averages for the whole period of 
observation (1980–2000). Data on years of schooling (SCHOOL) and inward 
FDI stocks (FDIST) refer to 1980, in order to contain endogeneity problems and 
capture the effects of these variables on subsequent growth. Finally, the shares 
of imports and exports in GDP, which are supposed to reflect developing 
countries’ openness to trade, are corrected for country size. We run a simple 





and take the residuals (RESIDIM and RESIDEX, respectively) as openness 
indicators, in order to avoid a large-country bias.
10 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for the overall sample, including API 
member countries for which the relevant data are available. It turns out that the 
claim of globalisation critics, according to which policy reforms along the lines 
suggested by the Washington Consensus are counterproductive, is grossly 
exaggerated. None of the correlations between policy-related variables and the 
growth performance of developing countries (GNIUS) supports the view that 
conventional economic policy measures which were taken in the context of 
stabilisation and structural reform programmes, and which have shaped the 
indicators considered here, were detrimental to growth. The correlation 
coefficients reported in the first column of Table 3 rather suggest that such 
measures helped higher growth, notably by encouraging factor accumulation and 
promoting openness to trade. 
First of all, higher investment in physical capital (GFCF) is associated with 
higher growth. The particularly strong correlation between GFCF and GNIUS 
may be surprising considering that physical capital accounts for only one-third 
 
                                           
10    Note that larger countries typically report smaller trade shares. For details of 





Table 3 —  Policy-related  Variables and the Growth Performance of 
Developing Countriesa: Cross-Country Correlations 
 GNIUS  INF  GOV  GFCF  SCHOOL  RESIDIM  RESIDEX  FDIFL 
INF  –0.15             
GOV  –0.18  –0.03           
GFCF  0.54***  –0.15  0.25**         
SCHOOL  0.28**  –0.01  0.08  0.38***       
RESIDIM 0.31***  –0.11  0.40***  0.62***  0.23**       
RESIDEX 0.26**  –0.14  0.18*  0.42*** 0.35*** 0.74***     
FDIFL  0.20* –0.02  0.29***  0.49***  0.34*** 0.60*** 0.51***   
FDIST 0.17  –0.05  –0.00  0.15 0.23**  0.44***  0.51***  0.33*** 
aFor detailed definitions of variables and statistical sources, see Annex. The number of 
observations ranges from 67 to more than 100. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 per 
cent level; ** 5 per cent level; * 10 per cent level (two-tailed test). 
Source: World Bank (2002); Barro and Lee (2002); UNCTAD (2002). 
 
of total production so that strongly diminishing returns to investment are to be 
expected (Easterly 2001: Chapter 3). However, the positive correlations between 
GFCF, SCHOOL, RESIDIM and FDIFL indicate that physical capital 
formation, typically, did not take place in isolation; it went hand in hand with 
human capital development and productivity-enhancing technology transfers via 
imports of capital goods and FDI inflows, which counteracted diminishing 





Second, the correlation between human capital formation and growth also turns 
out to be significantly positive, but the correlation coefficient is considerably 
smaller than in the case of GFCF. The latter finding points to the limitations of 
average years of schooling as a proxy of human capital formation; SCHOOL 
captures neither the quality of schooling nor the importance of vocational 
training. Third, in addition to domestic factor accumulation, openness to trade 
(reflected in RESIDIM and RESIDEX) appears to have helped developing 
countries to catch up economically to advanced industrial countries. 
All this is not to ignore that the effectiveness of conventional policy reforms was 
less than hoped for by the proponents of the Washington Consensus. For 
instance, macroeconomic stabilisation by fighting inflation (INF) and reducing 
government consumption (GOV) is not significantly correlated with higher 
growth. This is probably because macroeconomic stabilisation, though often 
required for sustainable growth, constrained growth in the short run.
11 
Furthermore, the relation between FDI and growth remains ambiguous. The 
finding that FDI inflows (FDIFL), but not previous FDI stocks (FDIST), are 
associated with higher growth is consistent with the recent academic literature 
on this issue and puts into question the euphoria currently prevailing among 
                                           
11   The insignificant correlation between INF and GNIUS may also indicate that the 
average level of inflation matters less for growth than the volatility of annual 





policymakers about FDI as a stimulus to growth.
12 It should be noted that the 
positive correlation between FDIFL and GNIUS may be because higher FDI 
inflows are induced by a favourable growth performance of host countries, 
rather than higher growth being the result of higher FDI inflows. 
The correlations reported in Table 3 have to be qualified in another respect. 
Elsewhere we have shown that the relation between policy-related variables and 
economic growth weakens considerably if the calculation is restricted to the 
subsample of developing countries with a per-capita income of less than 
1500 US$ in 1980 (Nunnenkamp 2003b). Several API members belong to this 
group, including Egypt, Mauritania, Sudan and Yemen. None of the openness 
indicators (RESIDIM, RESIDEX, FDIFL, and FDIST in Table 3) was 
associated with higher growth for the subsample of poor developing countries. 
In other words, openness to trade and FDI appears to have failed in inducing 
catching-up processes exactly where they were needed most. 
As concerns FDI, this finding is again in line with much of the relevant 
literature. In one way or another, recent empirical studies corroborate the 
proposition that developing countries must have reached a minimum level of 
economic development before they can capture the growth-enhancing effects of 
                                           
12   For a literature review and new findings on the link between FDI and economic 
growth in developing countries, see Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2003) and 





FDI (Nunnenkamp and Spatz 2003; Nunnenkamp 2003a). In addition, certain 
types of FDI are fairly unlikely to deliver significant growth effects. FDI aiming 
at the exploitation of natural resources, including oil, in the host countries is 
often concentrated in foreign-dominated enclaves with few linkages to the local 
markets. Rather than stimulating economic growth though spillovers, resource-
seeking FDI in the primary sector might lead the host country into some form of 
"Dutch Disease" (i.e., real currency appreciation not backed by productivity 
increases). 
In the remainder of this section, we show how Arab countries fit into the picture 
drawn for all developing countries. The presentation is restricted to those policy-
related variables which were shown before to be significantly correlated with 
growth.
13 Annex Figure 2 reveals the position of Arab countries with sufficient 
data in four scatter diagrams which plot policy-related variables against growth. 
In Table 4, we summarize the evidence by ranking Arab countries according to 
relevant policy-related variables. 
The following observations deserve to be mentioned. Among the four policy-
related variables, insufficient human capital formation is most likely to hinder 
economic growth in API member countries. While gross fixed capital formation  
 
                                           
13  Moreover, we focus on RESIDIM as an indicator of openness to trade. Unreported 





Table 4 —  Ranking of Arab Countriesa according to Relevant Policy-related 
Variables 






Import residual  
 
(1980-2000) 
FDI inflows  
 
(1980-2000) 
 GFCF  SCHOOL  RESIDIM  FDIFL 
Above  Algeria  (28.9) Kuwait  (4.5) Bahrain  (42.3) Tunisia  (2.1) 
median Tunisia  (27.2)  Jordan  (4.3)  Jordan  (32.0)  Egypt  (1.9) 
 Jordan  (26.8)  Syria  (3.7)  Lebanon  (21.7)  Jordan  (1.3) 
 UAE (24.9)  Bahrain  (3.6)  Mauritania (19.3)  Oman  (1.2) 
 Egypt  (23.9)      Kuwait (4.3)     
 Bahrain  (23.4)      Tunisia (1.8)     
 Syria (22.7)      UAE  (-1.1)     
  Morocco  (22.6)    Qatar  (-5.4)    
 Mauritania  (22.1)      Yemen  (-5.4)     
  Saudi Arabia  (21.4)    Saudi Arabia  (-5.7)    
         Oman  (-5.8)     
                
Below Yemen  (19.9)  Tunisia (2.9)  Libya (-9.0)  Mauritania  (0.8) 
median Kuwait  (17.9)  Algeria  (2.7) Egypt  (-9.6)  Sudan  (0.6) 
 Sudan  (13.7)  Iraq  (2.7)  Morocco  (-11.0) Lebanon  (0.5) 
     Egypt  (2.3)  Syria (-11.1)  Morocco  (0.5) 
     Sudan  (1.1)  Algeria  (-17.0) Syria  (0.5) 
     Yemen  (0.3)  Sudan  (-25.1)  Kuwait  (0.1) 
             Algeria  (0.1) 
                
aFor Arab countries not listed, the relevant data are not available. The median serving as 
the dividing line is for the sample of all developing countries. 
Source: see Annex Figure 2. 
 
(GFCF) exceeded the median for all developing countries in seven out of ten 
API member countries,
14 average years of schooling (SCHOOL) were fairly low 
by developing-country standards in various API member countries with data for 
this variable. The latter finding is in line with Hoekman and Messerlin (2002: 
                                           





23) who argue: "Although education has improved in the MENA region, it still 
lags behind the rest of the world". Similar to domestic factor accumulation, 
Table 4 points to an ambiguous position of API members with regard to 
openness. On the one hand, most of them were open to trade when the median of 
country-specific import residuals (RESIDIM) is taken as a yardstick.
15 On the 
other hand, FDI inflows remained below the median for all developing countries 
in five out of nine API member countries (in Algeria and Morocco, too). As 
argued above, however, minor FDI flows might be less damaging to growth than 
insufficient schooling in poor API members such as Mauritania and Sudan. 
At the same time, the ranking of API members presented in Table 4 underscores 
the elusive relation between policy-related variables and economic growth. For 
only some API members, the ranking resembles their position with regard to 
growth as given in Figure 1. Bahrain, Mauritania and Syria, whose growth 
performance was in the medium range, rank close to the median in Table 4, too, 
notably with regard to GFCF and SCHOOL. Egypt and Tunisia, the best growth 
performers among API members, rank favourably in terms of GFCF and FDI 
inflows. For both countries, however, average years of schooling (SCHOOL) are 
                                           
15  In contrast to the change in the share of imports in GDP reported in Table 2 above, 
the result for RESIDIM is in some conflict with Hoekman and Zarrouk (2000), who 
argue that the world-market integration of Arab countries is relatively weak. 
However, Hoekman and Messerlin (2002: 8) find a similarly ambiguous picture 





low by developing-country standards. The opposite pattern (low values of GFCF 
and FDIFL, but the best value of SCHOOL) is observed for Kuwait, whose 
growth performance heavily depends on the period of observation (see above on 
oil prices). 
The rankings with regard to policy-related variables and growth differ most 
strikingly in the cases of Sudan and Jordan. Sudan’s record is extremely poor in 
terms of openness to trade and domestic resource mobilisation. Weak incentives 
for domestic resource mobilisation can be attributed to the civil war in this 
country. Against this backdrop, it is highly unlikely that Sudan can sustain its 
relatively favourable growth performance reported in Figure 1. Political 
developments are crucially important in the case of Jordan, too, which suffered 
from the embargo against neighbouring Iraq. In the past, Jordan’s relative 
income position deteriorated significantly, even though this country is rated 
favourably in all four policy dimensions. Jordan thus represented the clearest 
example among API members suggesting that domestic resource mobilisation as 
well as openness to trade and FDI are not sufficient conditions for high growth 
of per-capita income. 
V.  How Influential Is Institutional Development? 
In the previous section, we rejected the view that policy reforms along the lines 





developing countries. It turned out, however, that the effectiveness of 
conventional policy reforms cannot be taken for granted. The experience of API 
member countries suggests that the relation between policy-related variables and 
economic growth is loose at best. Ambiguities are partly due to exogenous 
factors, among which world-market prices for commodities, notably oil, play a 
crucially important role for some API members (see also Yeats and Ng 2000: 
40). Yet, recent research invites an additional explanation for the ambiguous 
relation between conventional policy reforms and economic growth. Easterly 
and Levine (2002: 33) argue that "bad policies are only symptoms of longer-run 
institutional factors, and correcting the policies without correcting the 
institutions will bring little long-run benefit." Likewise, Acemoglu (2003) 
stresses the role of institutions as a fundamental cause of divergent economic 
fortunes, whereas policy-related variables such as investments and education are 
considered only proximate causes. According to Rodrik and Subramanian (2003: 
34), the primacy of institutions implies that "conditionality on policies [as 
required by the IMF and the  World Bank] is often ineffective."
16 
                                           
16   Factors related to geography, notably infectious diseases, high transport costs and 
low agricultural productivity in tropical areas, may represent another fundamental 
cause of divergent growth experiences. The geography hypothesis, the most 
prominent proponent of which is Sachs (2001), is not discussed here as most API 





In the following, we proceed as in the previous section: First, we present cross-
country correlation results based on the overall sample, in order to assess the 
general relevance of institutional factors. Second, we check how institutional 
development in Arab countries compares with that in the control group of other 
developing countries. As concerns institutional development, we refer to the 
widely used data presented by Kaufmann et al. (2002). This source comprises 
six indicators, all of which range from –2.5 to 2.5 (with higher values indicating 
better institutions): voice and accountability (VOICE), political stability 
(POLSTAB), government effectiveness (GOVEFF), regulatory quality (REG), 
rule of law (LAW), and control of corruption (COR). These factors are supposed 
to shape the incentive structure of economic agents. Hence, they are likely to 
affect policymaking, factor accumulation and, eventually, economic growth.
17 
And indeed, according to the correlations reported in Table 5, it would be 
unreasonable to assume that policy-related variables are truly exogenous growth 
determinants. All four policy-related variables that turned out to be relevant for 
growth in the previous section are correlated with institutional factors. 
Measuring institutional development by the average of the six indicators (INST), 
                                           
17   Studies on the determinants of international differences in the level of per-capita 
income use instrumental variables for institutional development. This is because 
institutional development, typically, is more advanced in higher-income countries. 
However, endogeneity problems are less relevant in the present context of analysing 





better institutions are associated with higher domestic factor accumulation 
(GFCF, SCHOOL) as well as more open trade and FDI policies (reflected in 
RESIDIM and FDIFL). The rule of law, i.e., the protection of persons and 
property, the availability of independent judges and effective contract 
enforcement, appears to be most important for physical capital formation. 
Average years of schooling are correlated most strongly with effective control of 
corruption and the rule of law. If corruption is pervasive, opening up to trade 
and attracting FDI inflows seem less likely. 
Table 5 —   Institutional  Factors,  Policy-related Variables and Economic 
Growth in Developing Countriesa: Cross-Country Correlations 
 GFCF  SCHOOL  RESIDIM  FDIFL  GNIUS 
INST 0.35***  0.64***  0.41*** 0.34***  0.35*** 
VOICE  0.16 0.45***  0.14 0.01  0.08 
POLSTAB 0.24**  0.48*** 0.28*** 0.23**  0.31*** 
GOVEFF 0.27** 0.57***  0.44*** 0.30***  0.34*** 
REG  0.22** 0.52***  0.22** 0.04  0.25** 
LAW 0.38***  0.60***  0.42*** 0.10  0.40*** 
COR 0.30***  0.61***  0.52*** 0.40***  0.34*** 
aFor detailed definitions of variables and statistical sources, see Annex. The number 
of observations ranges from 74 to more than 100. *** denotes statistical significance 
at the 1 per cent level; ** 5 per cent level; * 10 per cent level (two-tailed test). 





Against this backdrop, it is no longer surprising that institutional development 
appears to be crucially important for developing countries to catch up 
economically to advanced industrial countries. The correlation analysis suggests 
that the relative growth performance of developing countries, measured by 
GNIUS, improves most significantly when developing countries adhere to the 
rule of law. Other institutional factors that turn out to be relevant for growth 
include the control of corruption and government effectiveness. 
From an institutional perspective, the prospects for sustainable growth of per-
capita income appear to be slightly better for the group of API members than for 
the control group of other developing countries. Table 6 reveals that the median 
of INST (representing the average of all six institutional indicators) is less 
negative, i.e., more favourable, for API members than for other developing 
countries. A similar picture emerges for all individual indicators, except VOICE 
which, according to the evidence presented in the last column of Table 5, is the 
least important institutional growth determinant. API members compare most 
favourably with other developing countries with respect to LAW, i.e., the most 
important institutional growth determinant identified above. By contrast, the 
median of COR, which represents another important institutional factor, is only 





Table 6 —  Institutional  Development:a API Member Countries and Other 






  Median Top3b Bottom  3b (median) 
Voice and 
accountability  -0.67  J, K, Le  (-0.08)  Sy, Su, I (-1.54)  -0.26 
Political 
stability  -0.06c  Q, O, U  (1.04)  Y, Su, I  (-1.82)  -0.33   
Government 
effectiveness  0.04c  O, T, J  (0.72)  Li, Su, I  (-1.63)  -0.29 
Regulatory 
quality  0.10  B, T, J  (0.53)  Sy, Li, I  (-2.14)  -0.04 
Rule of  
law  0.26  Q, O, K  (1.08)  Li, Su, I  (-1.43)  -0.40 
Control of 
corruption  -0.24c  K, Q, O  (0.56)  Li, Su, I  (-1.05)  -0.32 
Average of six 
indicators  -0.02c  Q, O, K  (0.47)  Su, Li, I  (-1.58)  -0.26 
aIndicator values range from –2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better 
institutional development. – bIn descending order; average indicator value in 
parentheses. – cExcluding Mauritania for lack of data. 
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2002). 
However, the comparison between API members and the control group of other 
developing countries obscures that institutional development varies 
tremendously among the former. The average indicator value for the three 
countries which rank most unfavourably among API members (bottom 3 in 
Table 6), typically, is –1.5 or worse, whereas the average indicator value for the 





words, institutional development in the API group ranges over much of the 
spectrum of the index of Kaufmann et al. (2002). The same is true for other 
Arab countries (detailed results not shown): Institutional development according 
to INST is fairly advanced in Morocco (0.19), close to the median for other 
developing countries in Saudi Arabia (–0.24), and highly deficient in Algeria  
(–1.33). 
Apart from Iraq representing the taillight among API members in all 
institutional dimensions, it is for Sudan and Libya that institutional deficiencies 
are shown to be most severe in Table 6. The composition of the top 3 varies 
more across institutional dimensions than the composition of the bottom 3. On 
average, institutional development is reported to be most advanced in Qatar, 
Oman and Kuwait; the same countries are in the lead with regard to LAW. 
Finally, Figure 2 may offer some clues as to the sustainability of growth by 
plotting institutional development, as given by INST, against the relative growth 
performance of developing countries in 1980-2000 (GNIUS). Even though data 
on INST and GNIUS are available for only eight API members, Figure 2 
underscores the wide variation of institutional development within this small 
group of countries. Given their more advanced institutional development, four 
API countries performed poorly in terms of GNIUS: Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait 
and the United Arab Emirates. As noted before, this is largely due to oil price 





growth prospects of these countries appear to be relatively favourable in the 
absence of major external shocks. On the other hand, institutional development 
renders it rather unlikely that the three API members with the best growth 
performance in 1980-2000 (Egypt, Tunisia and Sudan; see also Figure 1 above) 
will remain in this position in the future. It is only for Tunisia that relatively 
advanced institutions tend to support sustainable growth. In sharp contrast, 
future growth appears to be constrained most seriously by institutional 
deficiencies in the case of Sudan, even if civil unrest were overcome. 
Figure 2 —  Institutional  Development  and  Economic  Growth
a: The Position of 
Arab Countries among All Developing Countries
b 




































aFor definition of variables and statistical sources, see Annex. The dotted vertical line 
represents the median of the sample of all developing countries.— 
bFor the 
abbreviations used for Arab countries, see footnote 1 on page 3. 





VI. Summary  and  Conclusions 
In this paper, we have discussed three possible explanations for the failure of 
most developing countries, including almost all Arab countries, to catch up 
economically to advanced industrial countries in the era of globalisation: (i) an 
insufficient reform-mindedness of developing country governments, (ii) 
counterproductive policy recipes of the Washington Consensus and (iii) more 
deeply rooted barriers to growth related to institutional deficiencies. The 
empirical evidence for Arab countries and other developing countries provides 
little support to the first two hypotheses. However, the effectiveness of 
conventional policy reforms seems to depend on country conditions. 
Furthermore, institutional factors are shown to have a significant impact on 
policy-related variables and the growth performance of developing countries. 
These findings have important implications for national policymakers and 
external advisers alike. Rather than applying standard recipes to all developing 
countries, country-specific conditions deserve closer attention when designing 
economic policy reforms. In developing countries with low per-capita income, 
domestic resource mobilisation appears to be more important than opening up to 
FDI. Some members of the Arab Planning Institute such as Sudan, Mauritania, 





member countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, human capital formation seems 
key to sustainable growth. 
Furthermore, it must be taken into account that the link between economic 
policy reforms and growth is loose at best. This is especially so for Arab 
countries, many of which are extremely dependent on oil price developments. At 
the same time, the case of Jordan demonstrates clearly that domestic resource 
mobilisation and openness to trade and FDI do not guarantee high growth. 
The lesson for international financial institutions is that pressing for economic 
policy reforms according to the Washington Consensus is not sufficient to 
improve the growth performance of developing countries. Policy conditionality 
along traditional lines has little effect unless the institutional underpinnings of 
“bad” policies are tackled. Moreover, reform programmes have to be based on 
realistic time horizons, as it takes considerable time to overcome deeply rooted 
institutional bottlenecks to sustainable growth. 
Redefining the Washington Consensus in this way might provide national 
policymakers with stronger incentives to initiate institutional change by 
enforcing the rule of law, fighting corruption, easing administrative interference 
in private business and improving the quality of public services. In all these 
respects, institutional development is more advanced for API members as a 





deficiencies tend to constrain future growth in several member states. Effective 
control of corruption appears to be the greatest institutional challenge of API 
governments, notably in Iraq, Sudan, Libya, Yemen and Syria. But even API 
countries in which institutional development is fairly advanced by developing-
country standards (notably Qatar and Oman, but also Kuwait, Jordan, and 
Tunisia) may further improve the institutional basis for sustainable growth. In 
terms of government effectiveness, control of corruption as well as political 
rights and civil liberties, the top 3-institutional performers among API countries 
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Definition of Variables and Data Sources 
Variables Abbreviation  Definition/Source 
Change in per-capita 
income 
GNIUS  Per-capita income (PPP) of country i (relative to 
per-capita income of the United States) in 2000, 
divided by per-capita income (PPP) of country i 
(relative to per-capita income of the United 
States) in 1980;  World Bank (2002); 
Exports EXSH  Exports of country i in per cent of its GDP; 
World Bank (2002); 
Export residual  RESIDEX  Exports  (EXSH) corrected for country size; 
country-specific residuals from the cross-
country regression: EXSH = a + b . POP, with: 
•  annual average of EXSH in 1980-2000 
•  POP  =  population of country i in 1990 
own calculation on the basis of World Bank 
(2002); 
FDI inflows  FDIFL  Inflow of FDI in per cent of the host country's 
GDP; World Bank (2002); 
Government 
consumption 
GOV  Government consumption expenditure in per 
cent of the country's GDP; World Bank (2002); 
Gross fixed capital 
formation 
GFCF  Gross fixed capital formation in per cent of the 
country's GDP; World Bank (2002); 
Imports IMSH  Imports of country i in per cent of its GDP; 
World Bank (2002); 
Import residual  RESIDIM  Imports  (IMSH) corrected for country size; 
country-specific residuals from the cross-
country regression: IMSH = a + b . POP, with: 
•  annual average of IMSH in 1980-2000 
•  POP =  population of country i in 1990 
own calculation on the basis of World Bank 
(2002); 
Import  tariff  revenues  TAR  Import tariff revenues in per cent of import 







Variables Abbreviation  Definition/Source 
Inflation  INF  Annual average change in consumer prices in 
per cent; World Bank (2002); 
Institutional 
development  
INST  Average of six indicators on institutional 
development in 1997/98: 
•  voice and accountability (VOICE) 
•  political stability and absence of violence 
(POLSTAB) 
•  government effectiveness (GOVEFF) 
•  regulatory quality (REG) 
•  rule of law (LAW) 
•  control of corruption (COR); 
indicators range from –2.5 to 2.5, with higher 
values indicating better institutional 
development; Kaufmann et al. (2002); 
Inward FDI stocks  FDIST  Stock  of  inward FDI in per cent of the host 
country's GDP; UNCTAD (2002); 
Per-capita income  GNI00 and 
GNI80 
Gross national income per capita in PPP terms 
in 2000 (GNI00) and 1980 (GNI80), in current 
international US$; World Bank (2002); 
Years of schooling  SCHOOL  Average years of schooling of the population 
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aSeveral countries not shown because of lacking data. 
 






Annex Figure 2 —  Policy-related Variables and Growth Performance
a: The Position 
of Arab Countries among All Developing Countries
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a)  Gross fixed capital formation and growth 



































b)  Years of schooling and growth 


































Annex Figure 2 continued
 
c)  Import residuals and growth 



































d)  FDI inflows and growth 
































aFor definition of variables and statistical sources, see Annex. In all four figures, the 
dotted vertical line represents the median of the sample of all developing countries.— 
bFor the abbreviations used for Arab countries, see footnote 1 on page 3. 
Source: World Bank (2002); Barro and Lee (2002). 